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It is well known that the English auction has many desirable properties when a single object is
to be sold. For example, with private values it implements the eﬃcient allocation uniquely in
weakly dominant strategies, and maximizes the seller’s expected revenue within a large class of
“simple” selling procedures (Lopomo [30]). However, the properties of generalized versions of
the English auction, in situations in which many objects are to be sold, and the buyers have use
for more than one object, are yet to be fully understood.
Current research on auctions with multiple objects can be organized into a normative and
a positive approach. The ﬁrst approach consists essentially in looking for mechanisms with
equilibria which satisfy some desirable properties, e.g. eﬃciency (Ausubel and Cramton [5],
Dasgupta and Maskin [18], Perry and Reny [38], and Es´ o and Maskin [22]), or seller’s revenue
maximization (Armstrong [3], Avery and Hendershott [8], Menicucci [33]). The positive approach
instead considers given auction formats, writes them down as games of incomplete information
and aims at characterizing their equilibrium sets.
This paper contributes to the second line of research. We study a multi-object version of
the English auction, henceforth named “simultaneous ascending bid auction”, similar to the
one recently used by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for the sale of spectrum
licences (see McAfee and McMillan [36]). We focus on the claim that this generalization of the
one-object English auction is more vulnerable to collusion in the multiple objects case than in
the single object case. Concerns about collusive behavior of bidders in the FCC auction have
emerged, for example, in an article published in The Economist [19]. More recently, Cramton
and Schwartz [16] have indicated evidence of collusive behavior in the FCC spectrum auctions,
and discussed the eﬀectiveness of various modiﬁcations of the auction rules in hindering bidders’
collusion.
Our analysis will provide elements to test the veracity of the following conjectures which
naturally arise on auctions with multiple objects:
• The presence of multiple objects facilitates collusion by allowing the bidders to signal
their willingness to abstain from competing over certain objects, provided they are not
challenged on others. In this way, the bidders can allocate the objects among themselves
without paying much.
• As the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases, the room
for collusive schemes such as the ones indicated in the previous conjecture becomes smaller.
1• Large complementarities in the bidders’ utility functions tend to hinder collusion. This is
because each bidder is less satisﬁed with owning only a subset of the objects on sale; she
has therefore an incentive to break the collusion and compete for all the objects in order
to fully realize the synergies.
In a model with two objects, we show that bidders with private information about their own
willingness to pay for each subset of objects can indeed take advantage of the signalling opportu-
nities provided by the sequential nature of open ascending bid auctions with multiple objects, by
coordinating on equilibria which generate a high level of expected surplus for them, a low level
of revenue for the seller, and socially ineﬃcient allocations of the objects. (Propositions 1 and
2). This kind of coordination however becomes more diﬃcult as the number of bidders increases
while the number of objects remains ﬁxed at two. (Propositions 4 and 5). Thus our analysis
lends support to the ﬁrst two conjectures listed above.
With regard to the third conjecture, we show that the sole presence of large complementarities
is not suﬃcient to eliminate the opportunity for the bidders to collude. In fact, in the extreme
case in which the levels of synergies are commonly known, and not too diﬀerent across the bidders,
the incentive structure is essentially identical to the case with no complementarities. However,
when the complementarities are not only large but also variable, the possibility of collusion is
seriously reduced. These results suggest that what is crucial in determining the likelihood of
collusion is not whether the complementarities are (on average) ‘large’, but how variable they
are.
It is important to note that the type of collusion considered in this paper requires no side
contracts among the bidders. Instead, collusive behavior emerges as a noncooperative equilibrium
phenomenon. This is a major diﬀerence with the single-object case, in which side contracts, or
future interaction, are in general necessary to sustain bidders’ collusion1.
The positive literature on multi-unit auctions has focused mainly on the case of identical
objects and non-increasing marginal willingness to pay in the bidders’ utility functions. One
of the earliest papers on coordination in multiple unit auctions is on procurement auctions, by
Anton and Yao [1]. They show that, under a condition which in the monopoly case corresponds
1Collusion in the single object case sustained by side contracts has been studied, among others by Campbell
[13], Graham and Marshall [23], Mailath and Zemsky [31], McAfee and McMillan [35] and Pesendorfer [39]. An
exception to the use of contracts to sustain collusion is in McAfee and McMillan [35]. They show that the bidders
can collude in ﬁrst-price auction in which ties are resolved with equal uniform probabilities. Caillaud and J´ ehiel
[12] have shown that the presence of negative externalities among the buyers may hinder the eﬀectiveness of
collusion. Collusive behavior in repeated single-object auctions has been studied by Hopenhayn and Skrzypacz
[25].
2to decreasing marginal willingness to pay, sellers who can bid for the entire production as well as
for single parts, can coordinate on ‘split award’ equilibria which generate a low level of surplus for
the monopsonist. Viswanathan, Wang and Witelski [42] have characterized equilibrium strategies
in sealed-bid discriminatory auctions for the case of two bidders.
The papers which are most closely related to the present paper in terms of the auction rules,
are Milgrom [34] and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [21]. Milgrom [34] analyzes the simulta-
neous ascending bid auction, mostly under the assumption that the bidders’ utility functions
are common knowledge. He discusses issues surrounding the auction’s performance in terms of
its ability of generating eﬃcient outcomes and its potential for maximizing the seller’s expected
revenue. In particular, for the case of two bidders, two objects and no private information,
Milgrom describes an equilibrium which is similar to the one described in Proposition 1 of this
paper: each bidder can buy one object for the minimum price allowed by the rules of the auction.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [21] have independently established a result which is essentially
identical to our Proposition 1, namely that ‘low revenue’ equilibria exist under mild conditions
on the bidders’ information structure. They also show that, without these mild conditions, more
limited forms of collusion can be sustained in equilibrium. In the present paper we also show
that the bidders can improve upon the equilibrium of Proposition 1 (Proposition 2), and that
collusion can also be sustained when complementarities are present (Proposition 7).
Another branch of the literature has analyzed the issue of the so-called ‘demand reduction’
in auctions with many identical objects. Ausubel and Cramton [4] study sealed-bid auctions of
shares of a single divisible asset, under the assumption that each buyer’s marginal willingness
to pay is non-increasing, and is determined by a privately known one-dimensional parameter.
They show that, in the sealed-bid uniform price auction, the buyers have an incentive to bid
less than their marginal willingness to pay for each unit, hence no equilibrium can induce an
ex-post eﬃcient allocation of the asset. A similar point is made by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Kahn [20]. When multiple identical objects are sold, it is not an equilibrium that bidders bid
‘straightforwardly’ for each object, i.e. up to the price that equals their valuations. Instead,
the bidders want to reduce their demand in order to keep the prices low. This behavior is
quite similar to what happens in oligopsonistic markets, the source of ineﬃciency being the
traditional one found in textbook monopoly models: by trying to buy (sell) a marginal unit,
the price on inframarginal units increases (decreases). In our paper, the objects for sale are
generally perceived as diﬀerent by each bidder; and the auction rules allow a diﬀerent price for
each object; which eliminates the main rationale for demand reduction. (This is akin to price
discrimination in the textbook monopoly model). As a result, ‘straightforward’ equilibria in
3which the bidders bid for each object up to their valuation do exist. However, as we show in
this paper, these straightforward equilibria are can be used as punishment to form other, more
collusive, equilibria.
Our equilibria have features in common with the sub-game perfect equilibria of a multi-
market repeated oligopoly model studied by Bernhaim and Winston [10]. They show that two
ﬁrms with relative cost advantages in producing diﬀerent goods can collude by creating “spheres
of inﬂuence”: that is, each ﬁrm monopolizes the market for the good that it produces most
eﬃciently and withdraws from the other market.
Pesendorfer [39] discusses a “ranking mechanism” which allows bidders to collude in multi-
unit auctions. While Pesendorfer analyzes a monopsony situation2, his ranking mechanism is
equivalent to the following mechanism in the monopoly case: each bidder announces a ranking
of the objects according to his values, and each object is bought for the minimum price by one
of the bidders who rank it the highest, with ties resolved uniformly. This mechanism induces a
uniform matching between objects and bidders: for example, with two objects and two bidders,
each bidder always buys exactly one object. The allocation induced by the equilibrium described
in our Proposition 2 also has this feature, but in Proposition 2, if the bidders rank the two
objects in the same way then the preferred object is assigned to the bidder with the highest
diﬀerence of values, and this bidder pays a price equal to her opponent’s diﬀerence in values. We
show that both the ranking mechanism and the outcome of Proposition 2 are interim-eﬃcient
for the bidders among all incentive compatible outcome functions such that each buyer always
buy exactly one object.
Benoˆ ıt and Krishna [9] analyze a model with complete information, common values, and
budget constrained bidders. They show that, with signiﬁcant complementarities, or with suﬃ-
ciently diﬀerent objects’ values, a sequence of single-object open ascending auctions yields more
revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction. Under diﬀerent auction rules, but still assum-
ing complete information, Ausubel and Schwartz [6] show that in fact a ‘collusive’ equilibrium is
the unique Nash equilibrium that satisﬁes backward induction. Finally, under a condition which
rules out complementarities in the buyers’ utility functions, G¨ ul and Stacchetti [24] have studied
a generalized version of the English auction akin to a tatonnement process, with emphasis on the
relation between its equilibria and the Walrasian equilibria of the underlying economy.
Environments in which the bidders have increasing marginal valuations have been considered
in Chakraborty [14], who has studied properties of various sealed-bid auctions formats. His paper
2Pesendorfer’s paper studies collusion in auctions for school milk contracts in Florida and Texas during the
1980s.
4also contains a good survey of existing work on multiple object auctions.
On the experimental side, recent work by Kwasnica and Sherstyuk [28] reports ﬁndings which
are consistent with the theoretical predictions of the present paper. In particular, collusion occurs
in auctions with two bidders and two objects, while it tends to disappear with ﬁve bidders.3
The present paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3 we begin
the analysis with the benchmark case of purely additive values, i.e. we assume that each bidder
obtains no synergies from owning multiple objects, hence her willingness to pay for one object is
independent of whether she is also buying other objects. The analysis of this case provides a useful
benchmark for the more realistic case in which complementarities are present. In particular, it
sheds light on the role played by multiple objects in facilitating collusion among the bidders. We
present conditions under which collusion-via-signaling can be sustained in equilibrium. Equilibria
in this class can be described for the simple case with only two bidders as follows. Each bidder
starts by placing the smallest possible bid on her most valued object, and no bid on the other
object. If only one bid is placed on each object, it becomes common knowledge that the objects
are ranked diﬀerently by the two bidders. In this case the bidders let the auction end in the
second round by remaining silent. Each bidder is thus awarded one object for the minimum
price. If, instead, the initial bids reveal that both bidders have a higher value for the same
object, then the bidding continues according to some equilibrium strategy, which can entail, for
example, a reversion to “bidding straightforwardly,” i.e. each bidder raising the bid on each
object if her value is higher than the current highest bid and she is not assigned the object. (See
Proposition 1 below.) Alternatively, the bidders may adopt some other continuation strategy in
which they proceed to signal more detailed information about their values in order to try again
to coordinate with each other and buy one object each for a relatively low price (Proposition 2).
In all equilibria of this kind, the outcome entails socially ineﬃcient allocations in some cases –
i.e. the objects are not always assigned in a way that maximizes the sum of the bidders’ values
– but the bidders end up paying less than they would by bidding straightforwardly throughout
the entire auction. The reduced payments make up for the loss of eﬃciency in assigning the
objects, hence each bidder’s interim expected surplus is higher.
For these equilibria, however, the probability that the bidders can collude via signaling de-
creases as the number of bidders increases. More precisely, the probability of assigning each
object to the bidder with the highest value increases as the number of bidders increases. These
results (Propositions 4 and 5 below) corroborate the conjecture that collusion in multiple unit
3Kwasnica [27] has also done experimental work on collusion in multiple object sealed-bid auctions, with
additive utility functions.
5auctions is a ‘low numbers’ phenomenon.
In section 4 we consider the case in which the bidders’ utility functions exhibit large com-
plementarities, i.e. their willingness to pay for the two objects together is much greater than
the sum of the two objects’s “stand alone” values. The presence of signiﬁcant complementar-
ities makes the simultaneous ascending bid auction a natural candidate for allocating multiple
objects eﬃciently, essentially because a bidder’s willingness to pay for any given object depends
on the probability of winning other complementary objects. As stated in the third conjecture
above, immediate intuition may lead one to think that large complementarities hinder collusion
by providing each bidder with a strong incentive to buy both objects rather than just one.
We show however that the sole presence of complementarities does not hinder collusion: the
bidders can still manage to buy one object each, at low prices. In fact, in the extreme case
in which the synergies are commonly known, and not too diﬀerent across the bidders, the in-
centive structure for the bidders is essentially identical to the case with no complementarities.
The eﬃciency loss however is much larger in this case because it includes the unrealized com-
plementarities. When the complementarities are not only large but also variable the possibility
of collusion is seriously reduced. The ﬁnal insight is then that not just the presence of large
complementarities but also their variability is important in deterring the bidders from colluding.
Section 5 contains some concluding remarks, and an appendix collects all the proofs.
2T h e M o d e l
Let N = {1,...,n} denote the set of bidders, and M = {1,...,m} the set of objects. Each bidder
i ∈ N has a quasi-linear utility function, with willingness to pay for each bundle J ⊂ M given
by ui (J). All values {ui (J)}J∈2M are privately known to bidder i. It is common knowledge that
such values are drawn according to a probability measure with support on a compact subset of
<2m
+ .
The objects are sold with a “simultaneous ascending bid auction”, which is a natural extension
of the standard one-object English auction to environments with multiple objects. The auction
proceeds in rounds. In each round t = 1,2,... , and for each object j ∈ M, each bidder i ∈ N
can either remain silent or raise the highest bid of the previous round by at least a minimum
amount. Formally, i’ sb i do no b j e c tj in round t, denoted b
j
i (t), can either be set equal to −∞,
which is to be interpreted as “no bid”, or must be a real number at least as large as bj (t − 1)+ε,
where ε > 0 is the minimum bid increment, and bj (t − 1) is the “current outstanding bid” from
6the previous round, deﬁned recursively by
b
j (0) = 0 and b
j (t): =m a x
©
b
j (t − 1),b
j
i (t); i ∈ N
ª
.
If at least one bidder places a new bid on some objects, i.e. if b
j
i (t) 6= −∞ for some i ∈ N and
j ∈ M, then for each of these objects j the new highest bid bj (t)i si d e n t i ﬁed, and a potential
winner is selected among the bidders who have made the new highest bid; and the auction moves
to the next round, with the potential winners of all other objects unchanged. If instead all
bidders remain silent on all objects, i.e. if b
j
i (t)=−∞ for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M, then the auction
ends, with each object j ∈ M assigned to the winner selected at the end of round t − 1, who
pays his last bid bj (t − 1).
We analyze equilibria of this auction when the minimum increment is negligible, i.e. for ε → 0.
We do not verify explicitly that the equilibria that we ﬁnd assuming a negligible minimum bid
are actually equilibria for ε close enough to zero. This can be done (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans
a n dK a h n[ 2 1] for an explicit analysis), but we have decided to omit the formal convergence
proofs in order to avoid lengthening the paper.
Furthermore, to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we establish our results for m =2 ,
i.e. with only two objects on sale. To simplify the notation, we deﬁne
vi := ui({1}), and wi := ui ({2});
and use interchangeably the terms ‘object v’( o b j e c tw)a n d‘ o b j e c t1’ (object 2).
Also, to model the presence of complementarities in a parsimonious way, we assume that the
size of the complementarity is independent of the two objects’ ‘stand-alone’ values. That is, the
value to bidder i of having both objects is
ui({1,2})=vi + wi + ki.
We assume that the vectors (vi,w i,k i) are drawn independently across bidders from the same
probability distribution with support [0,1]





with k > 1 (large complementarities.) The variables vi and wi have identical
marginal distributions, with density and c.d.f. denoted by f and F respectively. For later use, we
also deﬁne the variable ai := vi −wi, whose support is the interval [−1,1]. The density function
and the c.d.f. of each ai will be denoted g and G respectively.
We start the analysis in the next section with the case of no complementarities, i.e. ki =0
for all i ∈ N. Section 4 will be devoted to the case with positive complementarities.
73 Collusive Equilibria with No Complementarities
In this section we assume that the bidders have purely additive values:
ui({1,2})=vi + wi,i ∈ N,
or no complementarities, ki = 0 for each i. The analysis of the bidders’ equilibrium behavior in
this case provides a useful benchmark for the more realistic case in which complementarities are
present. In particular, it becomes clear that the presence of multiple objects facilitates collusion
among the bidders.
With additive values, the problem of allocating the objects eﬃciently is simple: for example
a sequence of one unit objects would assign each object to a buyer with the highest willingness
to pay. Work by Armstrong and Avery and Hendershott shows that the eﬃcient allocation may
or may not be optimal for a risk neutral revenue maximizing seller.4 We focus here on the
equilibrium set of the simultaneous ascending bid auction.
We begin with a set of three elementary, but important observations. First, with no comple-
mentarities, the following ‘Separated English Auctions’ (SEA) strategy, together with a suitable
belief system, forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium: for bidder i, r a i s et h eb i do ne a c ho b j e c tj
if the value ui ({j}) is higher than the current highest bid, and bidder i is not assigned object
j. Clearly, if all other bidders use the SEA strategy, player i’ sb e s tr e p l yi st od ot h es a m e .W e
state this result as Proposition 0, for an arbitrary number of objects and players.
Proposition 0 With no complementarities, for any n and m, the separated English auctions
(SEA) strategy proﬁle forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (with some consistent belief system)
after any history in the simultaneous ascending bid auction.
The second observation is that the SEA strategy can be used to form a continuation equilibrium
proﬁle after any partial history of the auction. It may then be used as a threat to deter aggres-
sive bidding, and thus sustain collusive outcomes, much like Pareto inferior sub-game perfect
equilibria are used to support collusive outcomes in repeated games.
The third observation follows immediately from an extension the well-known Revenue Equiv-
alence Theorem (Myerson [37]), which holds here because the bidders’ types are drawn from
4Both papers study models in which the values of a buyer who has use for more then one object are drawn from
binary distributions. Armstrong [2] analyzes the symmetric case and ﬁnds that revenue maximizing auctions are
also socially eﬃcient. He also shows however that this result may not hold with more general value distributions.
Avery and Hendershott [8] study a model with one identiﬁable buyer willing to buy two objects and many other
buyers with one-unit demands. They ﬁnd that the revenue maximizing auctions in this case are often ineﬃcient.
8independent and continuous probability distributions:5 given any objects’ allocation rule, the in-
centive compatibility constraints uniquely determine, up to a constant, both the interim expected
payment function and the interim expected surplus function of each bidder, in any equilibrium
of any auction game. Thus in particular, any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the simultaneous
ascending bid auction in which each bidder with type (0,0) expects zero surplus, and all other
types are better oﬀ than in the SEA equilibrium, must entail a socially ineﬃcient allocation of
the objects.6
3.1 Two Bidders
We begin with the two bidder case. The next Proposition establishes the existence of a symmet-
ric perfect Bayesian equilibrium which dominates the SEA in terms bidders’ interim expected
surplus7.R e c a l lt h a tF denotes the common marginal c.d.f. of vi and wi.
Proposition 1 Assume that E (x): =
R 1
0 xdF(x) ≥ 1
2. Then the following strategy, together
with some consistent belief system, forms a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
• types (vi,w i) such that vi ≥ wi open with {b1
i (1),b 2
i (1)} = {0,−∞};
• types (vi,w i) such that vi <w i open with {b1
i (1),b 2
i (1)} = {−∞,0};
• if the initial bids are diﬀerent, all types remain silent in round 2, i.e. b
j
i (1)=−∞, for all
i and j;
• if the initial bids are equal, or if, at any round, any bids diﬀers from the instructions given
above, then all types revert to the SEA strategy.
The equilibrium of Proposition 1 can be described as follows. Each bidder opens by making the
minimum bid (zero) only on her most preferred object. If, at the end of the ﬁrst round, the
bidders discover that they rank the objects diﬀerently, then they stop bidding, and each bidder
is able to buy the preferred object at the lowest possible price. If instead they discover that they
rank the two objects in the same way, then they revert to the SEA strategies.
5A generalization of Myerson’s result which includes our setting has been established, among others, by Krishna
and Maenner [26].
6Jehi´ el and Moldovanu [29] use in a similar way the Revenue Equivalence Theorem to point out that with
multiple objects the eﬃcient allocation is not in general revenue-maximizing.
7The existence of this equilibrium has been established independently by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [21].
9Why is the condition E (x) ≥ 1
2 needed? Consider any type of bidder 1 with v1 ≥ w1,a n d
suppose that the two bidders have followed the equilibrium strategy and opened with diﬀerent
bids in the ﬁrst round. Bidder 1 can now obtain v1 for the minimum price (zero), or compete for
both objects, thus obtaining an expected surplus of
S (v1,w 1 |L)=
Z v1
0
(v1 − v2) dFV (v2 |L)+
Z w1
0
(w1 − w2) dFW (w2 |L),
where FV (v2 |L)a n dFW (w2 |L) denote the c.d.f. of v2 and w2 respectively, both conditional on
the set L :=
©
(v2,w 2) ∈ [0,1]
2 |0 ≤ v2 ≤ w2
ª
.
Since for any ﬁxed v1, S (v1,·|L) is increasing, it is enough to check that all types (v1,v 1)–
i.e., all types on the diagonal of the type space – are willing to accept collusion, i.e. that
v1 ≥ S (v1,v 1 |L) for each v1 ∈ [0,1].
Clearly, this inequality holds for v1 = 0; and it is easy to see that the function S (v1,v 1 |L)
is convex in v1. Therefore it is enough to check that the inequality holds for the highest type
(1,1). This type gets both objects with probability 1 whenever competition is triggered, paying
a price equal to the expected value of the two objects for bidder 2, that is E (v2 |L)+E (w2 |L).






=2E (x). Acceptance of collusion gives a utility of 1. Therefore, the relevant
condition becomes:




Intuitively, the condition E (x) ≥ 1
2 can be interpreted as requiring that each bidder has to
expect a suﬃciently high degree of competition from her opponent, should the SEA strategies
be triggered. Otherwise there is no point in colluding, since both objects can be obtained at a
low expected price.
This point can actually be made even in a simple, complete information framework. Consider
the case with two bidders, two objects, and commonly known values (v1,w 1)=( h,h), and
(v2,w 2)=( l,l), with 0 <l<h .There is an equilibrium in which the bidders use strategies that
are similar to the SEA: bidder 2 bids on both objects up to l, and bidder 1 wins both objects
paying l, and receiving a total surplus of 2(h − l). However, for some values of l and h there is
another equilibrium, similar to the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 1, in which bidder
1 opens oﬀering 0 on object v and nothing on w, bidder 2 opens oﬀering nothing on v and 0 on
w, and in the next round the bidders remain silent. If any bidder deviates, each bidder bids on
each object up to her valuation. Clearly, bidder 2 has no proﬁtable deviations from this strategy.
Bidder 1 will not deviate if h ≥ 2(h − l), i.e. if the surplus obtained under collusion is higher
10than the surplus obtained triggering price competition. This is equivalent to l ≥ h
2, a condition
very similar to the one described for the incomplete information case, which can be interpreted
in the same way: in order to accept collusion a bidder with high values has to expect enough
competition by the other bidder.
With complete information however the auction can also end with each object sold for the
minimum bid, because it is clear at the beginning of the auction that each object will go to the
bidder with the highest value. For all other bidders is then optimal to let the ﬁrst bidder buy
the object for the minimum bid (as well as pushing up the price to their values). Thus, in the
example above, there is a third equilibrium in which bidder 2 lets bidder 1 buy both objects
for the minimum bid (zero). This type of ‘collusion’ can take place even in the one object case.
Instead, the equilibrium similar to the one of Proposition 1 can only exist in the presence of
multiple objects.
Remark 1. The equilibrium outcome of Proposition 1 is ineﬃcient whenever the bidders
rank the objects diﬀerently, and one bidder has higher values for both objects.
Remark 2. In Proposition 1 the SEA strategy is used to support collusion. The SEA strategy
is the worst punishment that a bidder can impose to an opponent if we rule out the possibility
that a buyer bids above her value on any object. If we allow for bidding above the values, then
worse punishments are possible, and the conditions for the existence of collusion become weaker.
For example, the following is a possible modiﬁcation of the strategies and the beliefs described
in Proposition 1: if at any point a bidder deviates from the equilibrium path, then the other
bidder believes that the deviator’s type is (1,1) and raises the bids on both objects up to 1.I n
this case, a bidder who deviates from the equilibrium strategy receives a payoﬀ equal to 0; hence
collusion can be sustained without any condition on the probability distribution. However, this
equilibrium relies on the fact that the bidder who observes a deviation is willing to place bids
that are above her valuations, conﬁdent that she will lose with probability one.
Remark 3. The presence of ex ante asymmetries in the valuation of the two objects makes
it more diﬃcult to sustain collusion, but not impossible. Consider the same framework as before,
but assume that for each i the value wi is distributed according to a c.d.f. FW with support on





,s ot h a tE (wi)=βE (vi).
The type space is now a rectangle with base 1 and height β.W ec a nd i v i d et h et y p es p a c ea l o n g
the diagonal (the line given by the equation w = βv) and check whether a collusive equilibrium
of the type described in Proposition 1 exists. In particular, we now want types such that w>βv
to open with {−∞,0},t y p e sw ≤ βv to open with {0,−∞} and the bidding to stop if initial bids
11are diﬀerent. Under what conditions on the distribution can collusion be sustained? As in the
symmetric case, it is enough to check incentives for types on the diagonal, and it can again be
shown that it is enough to make sure that type (1,β), that is the type on the upper-right corner
of the type space, is willing to collude. Considering ﬁrst the types in the lower triangle, i.e. with






which is weaker than E (x) ≥ 1
2. It is intuitively clear however that it is harder to convince
the types who accept the less valuable object to go along with the collusive strategy instead of
triggering the SEA strategies. In order to make sure that all types (v,w)w i t hw>βv are willing
to accept collusion we have to check that types arbitrarily close to (1,β)p r e f e rh a v i n gw for free






This condition is stronger than E (x) ≥ 1
2.T h i sc o n ﬁrms the intuition that asymmetries tend to
hinder collusion. As expected, the diﬃculty comes from the need to guarantee that the bidder
who is assigned the less valuable object is not willing to ﬁght for both objects. The expected
payment that this bidder has to make if competition is triggered must now be higher than in the
case in which objects are ex-ante symmetric. Using the distance between β and 1 as a measure of
the asymmetry, it is also clear that the condition for collusion to be possible becomes increasingly
stronger as the asymmetry increases, another intuitive result. As β approaches 1, 1
1+β tends to 1
2;
hence small deviations from symmetry do not really jeopardize the possibility of collusion. As β
approaches zero (strong asymmetry) collusion becomes nearly impossible: no bidder is satisﬁed
with having only the less valuable object.
In the next subsection, we show that the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the simultaneous
ascending bid auction contains other, “more collusive” equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which each
type of both bidders end up with a higher (interim) expected surplus.
3.1.1 Getting More out of Collusion
The equilibrium strategy described in Proposition 1 prescribes that the bidders revert to the
SEA strategies when they open with the same bids, i.e. when it becomes common knowledge
that their preferred object is the same. It is natural to ask whether, even after learning that they
rank the objects in the same way, the bidders can do better than reverting to the SEA strategy,
12by trying again to coordinate themselves and buy one object each at relatively low prices. The
next Proposition establishes that this is indeed possible, if the values’ distribution satisﬁes the
following
Condition A Let F be a c.d.f. satisfying F (0) = 1−F (1)=0 , and let x, y be two independent
random variables, each with c.d.f. F.W es a yt h a tF satisﬁes Condition A if, for each α ∈ [0,1],
the following inequalities hold:
E [x| α ≤ x]+E [y | y ≤ 1 − α] ≥ 1, (1)
E [x| x − y ≥ α]+E [y | x − y ≥ α] ≥ 1. (2)
Setting α =0y i e l d sE (x) ≥ 1
2 both in (1) and in (2), because by symmetry




E [x| x ≥ y]+2 E [x| y ≥ x]
¶
=2 E [x].
Thus Condition A is stronger than the condition used to sustain the collusive equilibrium of
Proposition 1. Condition A is satisﬁed, for example, by the following family of densities8







Proposition 2 Under condition A the following strategy, together with some consistent belief
system, forms a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
First round:
• All types (vi,w i) such that vi ≥ wi open with {b1
i (1),b 2
i (1)} = {0,−∞};
• types (vi,w i) such that vi <w i open with {b1
i (1),b 2
i (1)} = {−∞,0}.
Subsequent rounds:












E [x + y| x − y ≥ α] − 1 =
2(1 − α)
2 s
12 − s2α2 − 2s2α
.
Both expressions are positive for α ∈ [0,1)a n ds ∈ [0,2].
13• If the initial bids are either {{0,−∞},{−∞,0}} or {{−∞,0},{0,−∞}}, all types
remain silent;
• If the initial bids are {{0,−∞},{0,−∞}}, then all types (vi,w i) such that vi−wi = ai
keep raising their bid on object v while refraining from bidding on w until either i) the
opponent stops, or ii) the bids reach the value ai.I nc a s ei ) ,t h e s et y p e sr e m a i ns i l e n t
for the next two rounds; and in case ii) they bid {−∞,0} for two consecutive rounds,
thus moving the outstanding bid on w from −∞ to 0.
• If the initial bids are {{−∞,0},{−∞,0}}, the strategy is symmetric, with the roles
of v and w switched.
Out—of—equilibrium paths:
• If at any round a bid not in accordance to the above described strategy is observed,
then each type reverts to the SEA strategy.
The behavior implied by the equilibrium of Proposition 2 can be described as follows. The
bidders open by signalling which object they prefer. If they prefer diﬀerent objects, the auction
ends in the ﬁrst round, as in the equilibrium of Proposition 1. If instead they prefer the same
object, say v,t h e nt h e yk e e pr a i s i n gt h ep r i c eo nv while abstaining from competing on w,w i t h
bidder i prepared to bid up to the diﬀerence between her two values ai = vi − wi. Therefore,
if ai >a 3−i, bidder i ends up buying object v at a price equal to the diﬀerence between her
opponent’s values, i.e. a3−i. Her opponent stops competing on v when the price reaches a3−i,
and buys w for the minimum bid.
In this equilibrium, the type set of each bidder [0,1]
2 is partitioned into lines with slope 1:
types on the same line – i.e. with the same diﬀerence between the two objects’ values – behave
identically, hence remain indistinguishable, until the end of the auction.
The role of Condition A is to guarantee that, given the residual pooling of low and high types
at any stage, each bidder has no incentive to trigger the SEA strategies, because she assigns a
suﬃciently high conditional probability to her opponent having high values. To see this, suppose
that both bidders have opened signalling that they prefer v to w. Then the equilibrium strategy
prescribes that all types (v1,w 1) such that v1−w1 = a bid on v until the price reaches a and then
yield, obtaining w for free and letting the opponent buy v at price a. When is this an optimal
strategy for all types?
It is easy to see that, just as in the case in which the bidders open with diﬀerent bids,
the gain from triggering the SEA strategies is higher for types with higher values of v1 (and
14consequently w1). In particular, suppose that the price for v has reached a, and that bidder 1’s




(v2,w 2) ∈ [0,1]
2 | v2 − w2 ≥ a
ª
.
Therefore she also knows that she will win both objects if the SEA strategies are triggered. Thus
she is prepared to buy only object w for free if the following inequality is satisﬁed:
1 − a ≥ 1 − E [v2 | L(a)] + (1 − a) − E [w2 | L(a)]
or, equivalently, if:
E [w2 | L(a)] + E [v2 | L(a)] ≥ 1.
With the appropriate changes in notation, this is exactly inequality (2) in Condition A.
Inequality (1) guarantees, when the price for v has reached a, bidder 2 is willing to buy object
v at a = v − w, giving up the ﬁght for w. Suppose that bidder 2 observes that bidder 1 stops
bidding on v at the price a0. Then it becomes common knowledge that bidder 1’s type lies on the
line v = w+a0. Therefore, conditional on this information, bidder 2 must be better oﬀ paying a0
for v rather than triggering the SEA strategies. In this case it can be shown again that in order
to convince all types on the line v1 = w1+a it is enough to convince the highest type, (1,1 − a).
Furthermore, it is enough to show that this type is willing to pay the price a, since at any price
a0 <ashe is better oﬀ. After some manipulations, this is shown to be equivalent to inequality
(1)i nC o n d i t i o nA .
It is worth noting that the bidders’ behavior is robust to perturbations in their beliefs about
their opponents’ values. That is, if the postulated types’ distribution F is such that conditions
(1) and (2) hold as strict inequalities, then each bidder has no incentive to deviate at any round,
even if her beliefs are only approximately described by F.
It is crucial however that no object is assigned before the end of the auction, so that each
object can still be bought after any number of rounds in which its outstanding bid has not moved.
Thus, in the equilibrium of Proposition 2, for many rounds bidding occurs only on one object,
while no activity takes place on the other. It is natural to conjecture then that this equilibrium
can be destroyed by introducing some “activity rules”, i.e. conditions specifying that if the
outstanding bid on an object does not increase by at least a certain amount every given number
of rounds, then the object be assigned to a bidder who has made the highest bid.9 To be eﬀective,
these active rules would have to specify suﬃciently large minimum bid increments, otherwise it
9See for example, Cramton [15].
15is easy to circumvent them by raising the bids only slightly, from time to time, on the non-active
object. Large minimum bid increments however also work against allocative eﬃciency: they may
prevent a buyer from getting an object when she has the highest value and her opponent’s value
is not much smaller.10
Moreover, even severe activity rules may not be suﬃcient to eliminate all collusive equilibria.
In particular, if “jump bidding”11 is allowed, equilibrium outcomes that are close to the one of
Proposition 2 can be obtained in fewer periods by compressing the competition on the object
that they both rank higher (say v), by bidding at each round more than the minimum increment
on v and remaining silent (or raising the bid just the minimum increment, if necessary to bypass
the activity rules) on w. For a complete analysis of the issue however, it is necessary to specify
exactly the activity rules introduced and look at the equilibrium set of the resulting game form,
a task beyond the scope of this paper.
T h et h r e ee q u i l i b r i at h a tw eh a v ei d e n t i ﬁed so far, i.e. the SEA equilibrium and the equi-
libria described in Propositions 1 and 2, can be ranked both in terms of expected social surplus
and bidders’ interim expected surplus. The SEA equilibrium outcome is socially eﬃcient, but
generates the lowest bidders’ surplus. The expected social surplus decreases, while the expected
surplus of each bidder, conditional on any realization of her type, increases, as we move to the
equilibria of Propositions 1 and then 2. This is because the equilibrium of Proposition 1 entails
a lower degree of collusion: if the bidders happen to prefer the same object, they open with
the same bids, thus triggering the SEA strategies, which generate eﬃcient allocations. In the
equilibrium of Proposition 2 the bidders refrain from using the SEA strategies even after learning
that the objects are ranked in the same way. Instead, they continue searching for a way of buying
one object each, while keeping the prices as low as possible.
3.1.2 Maximizing Bidders’ Surplus.
In this section we provide a partial characterization of the bidder’s interim-eﬃcient frontier within
the set of all allocations in which each buyer is always awarded exactly one object, and buyers
with type (0,0) receive zero surplus. We interpret the ﬁrst feature as a ‘no regret condition’,
which may arise when the buyers are trying to implement a collusive scheme in multi-object
auction environments: only if a buyer obtains at least one object will she be willing to follow a
10For example, suppose that an object is value 0.5b yt h eﬁrst bidder and 0.6 by the second bidder. Suppose
also that the minimum increment is 0.15. If the ﬁrst bidder is currently winning the object with a bid of 0.46,
then the second bidder gives up, causing an ineﬃcient allocation.
11Jump bidding in one-object English auctions has been studied by Avery [7] and Daniel and Hirshleifer [17].
16collusive strategy, and refrain from triggering competition on both objects.
We show that both Pesendorfer’s ranking mechanism and the allocation implied by the equi-
librium of Proposition 2 can maximize a weighted sum of the expected surplus of all bidder’s
types among the allocations that satisfy incentive compatibility and the ‘no regret’ condition
requiring that each buyer always obtains one object.
We point out that the question we are tackling in this section is not whether the equilibrium
described in Proposition 2 is ‘the best’ for the bidders within the equilibrium set of the particular
simultaneous ascending bid auction that we analyze in this paper. Rather, in this section we
provide results that can be used to address the following question: If the bidders were free to
design the trading procedure so to implement an incentive compatible, and no regret allocation
of the two objects, what allocation would they choose?
It is convenient at this point to reparametrize the model so that buyer i’s type becomes the
pair (ai,w i), where ai := vi − wi. The joint density ξ (ai,w i), obtained from the joint density of













− := {(a,w) ∈ [−1,0] × [0,1]| − a ≤ w}
correspond to the triangles below and above the diagonal respectively in the (v,w) space.
A direct mechanism consists of three functions for each buyer i = 1,2, specifying the prob-
ability qi
V (a1,w 1,a 2,w 2) of obtaining object v, the probability qi
W (a1,w 1,a 2,w 2) of obtaining
object w and her payment to the seller mi (a1,w 1,a 2,w 2), for any type realization (a1,w 1,a 2,w 2)
in Θ2.
The resulting expected surplus for buyer i conditional on having type (ai,w i), and reporting
her true type, can be written as
U
i (ai,w i) ≡ ai Q
i
V (ai,w i)+wi X










V (ai,w i,a 3−i,w 3−i) ξ (a3−i,w 3−i) dw3−ida3−i,
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V (ai,w i,a 3−i,w 3−i)+q
i
W (ai,w i,a 3−i,w 3−i)
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ξ (a3−i,w 3−i) dw3−i da3−i,
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i (ai,w i)=1, all (ai,w i),
for each i, and the buyer’s expected surplus becomes
U
i (ai,w i)=ai Q
i
V (ai,w i)+wi − M
i (ai,w i).
Finally, since the buyers are ex ante symmetric, we can focus without additional loss of generality
on symmetric mechanisms, hence drop all subscripts and superscripts “i” in the expression for
each buyer’s expected surplus.
An allocation is interim eﬃcient within a given feasible set if it maximizes a weighted sum of
all types’ expected surplus; i.e.
ZZ
Θ
ψ (a,w) U (a,w) dadw, (3)
for some function ψ : Θ → R+. In particular, if ψ(a,w)=ξ (a,w), the joint density of (a,w),
the objective function becomes the ex ante expected surplus.
Let ψA (a) ≡
R 1−a
0 ψ(a,w) dw, and ΨA(a) ≡
R a
0 ψA(t) dt, and without loss of generality
normalize the function ψ so that ΨA (1)=1. Recall that g denotes the density of a.
Proposition 3 Consider the class of all incentive compatible allocation such that each buyer
always receives one object, and U (0,0) = 0. The weighted sum in (3) is maximized within this
class by the equilibrium of Proposition 2 if the ratio
1 − ΨA(a)
g (a)
is increasing for a ≥ 0,
and by the ranking mechanism if
R a
0 [1 − ΨA (t)]dt
2
R 1






To illustrate, suppose that f is uniform, hence g (a)=1 − a for a ≥ 0, and the weighting





, with s ∈ [−2,2]. Then the equilibrium of Proposition
2 is optimal for s>0, and the ranking mechanism is optimal if s<0.12
12Proposition 3 is similar to Theorem 1 in McAfee and McMillan [35]. Their result however applies to the
maximization of ex-ante expected bidders’ surplus, for the single object case.
183.2 More than Two Bidders
The equilibria described in Propositions 1 a n d2m a ys e e mt or e l yh e a v i l yo nt h ef a c tt h a tt h e
number of bidders is equal to the number of objects. However, some degree of collusion is still
possible even when there are more bidders than objects. The basic idea is that the bidders can
follow the SEA strategy until only 2 players are left, and then adopt the strategies described in
Propositions 1 o r2t od i v i d et h eo b j e c t s .
Proposition 4 If there are n>2 bidders and the c.d.f. F (x) satisﬁes E [x|x ≥ z] ≥ 1+z
2 for
each z ∈ [0,1], then the following strategy, together with some consistent belief system, forms a
(symmetric) perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
• Round 1:I fvi ≥ wi, open with {0,−∞}, otherwise open with {−∞,0};
• Round t: if more than two bidders were active at round t−1, all types use the SEA strategy.
If instead at round t − 1 only i and j 6= i were active, and bidder j opened with {−∞,0},
then types (vi,w i) such that vi ≥ wi raise the bid on v.T y p e s(vi,w i) such that vi ≤ wi use
a symmetric strategy if j opened with {0,−∞}.
• If the observed history of bids is not obtained according to the strategies previously described,
then all types revert to the SEA strategy.
A family of c.d.f.’s which satisﬁes the condition E [x|x ≥ z] ≥ 1
2 (1 + z) for each z ∈ [0,1]i s
F (x)=xα,w i t hα ≥ 1.I nt h i sc a s ew eh a v e


















1 − zα+1 + z − zα.
It can be checked that the RHS is increasing in z, for z ∈ [0,1], and converging to the LHS as
z → 1.
The equilibrium of Proposition 4 works as follows. Each bidder opens signaling how she ranks
the two objects. After that, the prices of the two objects start increasing in parallel. If at some
point, say when the price of both objects is z, only two players are still active, and they rank the
objects diﬀerently, then they stop bidding and each buys the preferred object at z. Collusion in
this equilibrium becomes less eﬀective as the number of bidders increases, for two reasons. First,
19the probability of collusion is lower. Second, even if collusion occurs, the price paid is in general
higher.
To have an idea of the impact of the number of players on the possibility of collusion, we
compute the probability that collusion occurs as a function of the number of bidders. With only
two bidders, collusion occurs when the rankings are diﬀerent, that is:
Pr[collusion] = Pr[v1 <w 1,v 2 >w 2]+P r[ v1 >w 1,v 2 <w 2]=
1
2
With n bidders, collusion occurs when two bidders have the highest two valuations for each
objects and they rank the objects diﬀerently. For example, the probability that bidders 1 and 2
a r ea b l et oc o l l u d ei s :






Pr[max{v3,...,v n} < min{v1,v 2}]
2 ,
where we have exploited the assumptions of independence and identical distribution among
players and objects.
Since the density of min{v1,v 2} is 2f (y)[1 − F (y)] and the c.d.f. of max{v3,...,v n} is
F n−2 (y), we have:
























































With n =2 , we obtain 1
2, the same result as before. The probability of collusion decreases
rapidly, reaching 5% when n = 5. It is worth noting that collusion essentially disappears when
there are 5 players in the experiments carried on by Kwasnica and Sherstyuk [28].
The equilibrium of Proposition 2 can also be extended to the case of n>2b i d d e r s .
20Proposition 5 Suppose that there are n>2 bidders and the c.d.f. F is such that for each pair
(a,z) such that z ∈ [0,1] and a ∈ [0,1 − z] the two following conditions are satisﬁed:
E (x|z ≤ x ≤ 1 − a)+E (y |z + a ≤ y ≤ 1) ≥ 1 + z (4)
E (x | x − y ≥ a, y ≥ z)+E (y | x − y ≥ a ≥ z, x ≥ a + z) ≥ 1 + z. (5)
Then the following strategy is part of a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium: Behave as in
Proposition 4 except at the following point:
• If at round t − 1 only you and another bidder were active then:
• If vi ≥ wi and you opened with {0,−∞} while the other bidder opened with {−∞,0} then
increase the bid on v and not on w,t h e ns t o p .
• If vi <w i and you opened with {−∞,0} while the other bidder opened with {0,−∞} then
increase the bid on w and not on v,t h e ns t o p .
• If both players opened with {0,−∞} and z was the last oﬀer for both objects then increase
the bid on v up to z +ai, while keeping the oﬀer for w at z. If the other bidder oﬀers more
than z + ai then get w for z.O t h e r w i s e ,g e tv at the price at which competition ends, and
leave w to the other bidder.
Conditions (4) and (5) are also satisﬁed by the uniform distribution. This equilibrium works
as the one of Proposition 4: the bidders start signalling which object they prefer and then push
up both prices until only two players are left. The diﬀerence is that at that point the same
strategies as in Proposition 2 are used: if bidders have opened showing that they rank the two
objects in the same way, then they compete only on the top ranked object. The stopping point
for each player is z + ai, that is the last bid plus the diﬀerence between the two values.
As a ﬁnal comment to this section, we observe that the equilibria described in Propositions 4
and 5 may be vulnerable to the imposition of anonymity rules. For example, the auction format
may specify that at each round only the two best bids are announced, and it is not revealed who
made the bid. This obviously reduces the signaling possibilities for the bidders. However, even
if anonymity rules are applied it may be possible to ﬁnd ways to signal the relevant information.
Consider the following variant of the equilibrium established in Proposition 4. In the ﬁrst stage
only bidder 1 makes an oﬀer. In the second stage only bidder 2 makes an oﬀer, and so on up
to stage n.I nt h i sw a y ,i nt h eﬁrst n rounds the ranking of the objects of each bidder is made
public. At stage n + 1 bidder 1 moves again, either increasing the bid on both objects or on a
21single object. In the ﬁrst case the bidder signals that she is still available for collusion, while in
the second case the signal is that she is dropping out of the race for the other object and is no
longer available for collusions. At stage n + 2 bidder two moves and so on. In this equilibria
anonymity rules are completing ineﬀective in hindering collusion, and the same allocation as in
Proposition 4 can be implemented as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. A similar reasoning applies
to the equilibrium of Proposition 5.
4 Collusive Equilibria with Large Complementarities
In this section we consider the case of complementarities, and we restrict the attention to the
case of two bidders.13 When complementarities are present, the value of the bundle is greater
than the sum of the ‘stand alone’ values. As mentioned in Section 2, we deﬁne ui (1)=vi,
ui(2) = wi and ui ({1,2})=vi+wi+ki, i = 1,2, and we maintain the assumption that vi and wi
are drawn from a symmetric distribution with support [0,1]
2,m a r g i n a ld e n s i t yf,a n dm a r g i n a l
c.d.f. F. W ea l s oa s s u m et h a tf o re a c hp l a y e ri = 1,2, the value of the complementarity ki is




.E a c h
random variable ki is independent of (vj,w j,k j)f o re a c hj 6= i.
Finding equilibria in the presence of complementarities is complicated by the fact that, at
any given round of the auction, a bidder’s willingness to pay for a given object depends on
the probability of winning the other object. This destroys the ‘belief-free’ nature of the SEA
equilibrium described in Proposition 0. We can show however that, if the complementarities are
commonly known to be ‘large’, in a sense to be made precise, then a “competitive” equilibrium
similar to the one found in Proposition 0 can be obtained. Deﬁne θi := vi + wi + ki, the total
value of the bundle for bidder i.
Proposition 6 With n players, 2 objects, and k > 1, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which the two objects are allocated to the bidder with the highest θi, at a price equal to the
second highest valuation (i.e. maxj6=iθj).
The basic intuition here is as follows. Under the assumptions of Proposition 6, if the buyers
compete on both objects, then the auction cannot end with each bidder buying just one object.
The reason is that if a bidder has won one object then the value of the other object is at least
13Menicucci [33] has characterized revenue maximizing auctions in an extension of Armstrong’s model which
allows for complemetarities in the buyers’ utility functions. He ﬁnds that in general optimal auctions are not
eﬃcient.
22k > 1. This is more than the stand-alone value of any bidder. Therefore, all bidders behave as
if they were bidding for a single object, the bundle {v,w}.
This of course is not true if there are moderate complementarities, i.e. ki ∈ (0,1). In this case
it is diﬃcult to characterize even the “competitive” equilibria, similar to the ones of Propositions
0 and 6, which could be used as threat to sustain more collusive outcomes.14
The equilibrium of Proposition 6 can be used as a threat to sustain collusive equilibria when
large complementarities are present. The next Proposition establishes the existence of an equi-
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Proposition 7 There exist two sets Av ⊂ Θv and Aw ⊂ Θw such that the following strategy,
together with some belief system, forms a (symmetric) PBE:







\{Av ∪ Aw} open with {0,0} and compete for both
objects;
• Types (vi,w i) ∈ Aw open with {−∞,0}
• Types (vi,w i) ∈ Av open with {0,−∞}.
• If the initial bids are {{0,−∞},{−∞,0}} or {{−∞,0},{0,−∞}} then bidders do not
place any further bid. For all other opening bids having positive probability in accordance
to the strategy described above, the bidders play the equilibrium described in Proposition 6.
• If, at any stage, a bidder makes a bid which cannot be observed if the strategy above described
is followed, then the bidders play the equilibrium described in Proposition 6.
The sets Av and Aw are symmetric in the sense that (v,w,k) ∈ Av if and only if (w,v,k) ∈
Aw.
14To the best of our knowledge, the only results available so far in the moderate complemetatiries case are due
to Sherstyuk (2000), who has shown that, for any common complemetarity term k ≥ 0, there exists a competitive
equilibrium, i.e. an allocation of the objects and a price pair (pv,p w) such that demand equals supply.
23The equilibrium of Proposition 7 is a natural generalization of the equilibrium described in
Proposition 1. The set of types of each bidder is partitioned into three subsets. The ﬁrst subset
consists of those types who cannot be induced to collude. These are the types who have very
low stand-alone values for each object; hence they are only interested in having the two objects
together, and are not interested in having a single object, even at a very low price. To illustrate,
suppose that bidder 1’s type is (0,0,k 1), and recall that θi := vi+wi+ki, for i = 1,2. If bidder 1
accepts to buy only one object at price zero, her utility is zero. On the other hand, the expected
surplus from competing for both objects is (k1 − E [θ2 | θ2 ≤ k1])Pr(θ2 ≤ k1), which is positive,
although possibly small. It is clear that types like (ε1,ε2,k), for ε1 and ε2 suﬃciently small, will
also be unwilling to collude.
However, types with a stand-alone value for v suﬃciently high are in fact willing to collude.
In particular, assume that bidder 1 has type (v1,w 1,k 1) ∈ Θv, i.e. with v1 >w 1, and suppose
that at the ﬁrst round bidder 1 learns that her opponent’s type lies in some subset Aw ⊂ Θw.




(θ1 − θ2) dH (θ2 |(v2,w 2,k 2) ∈ Aw)( 6 )
where H denotes the conditional c.d.f. of θ2. In equilibrium, the set Av will be exactly the set
of those types for whom the inequality in (6) is satisﬁed. A similar inequality will deﬁne Aw.
In equilibrium the two sets Av and Aw have to be deﬁned simultaneously. It is intuitive from
inequality (6)that the two sets will be symmetric.
The shape of the set Av is roughly as follows. Suppose that bidder 1 has v1 ≥ w1.L e t u s




.I ti sc l e a r
that if the pair (v∗
1,θ∗
1)s a t i s ﬁes inequality (6) then all pairs (v∗
1,θ1)w i t hθ1 < θ∗
1 will also satisfy
the inequality. The inequality is also satisﬁed by the types characterized by the pair (0,k). This
type has no use for a single object, but is also sure to lose the competition for the two objects.
Thus, (6) holds with equality. It is also clear that all types characterized by pairs like (v1,v 1 + k)
are willing to collude. These are types for whom w1 = 0 and have the lowest possible value for
the synergy. If they compete for both objects they pay at least k (the lowest possible value for
θ2), and receive less utility than v1, which is what they would get accepting collusion. In general,
for a given v1 there will be a corresponding value θ1 (v1)s u c ht h a tt y p e sw i t hθ1 < θ1 (v1)a r e
willing to accept collusion and types with θ1 > θ1 (v1) prefer to compete for both objects rather
than to accept collusion. The shape of the set Av is thus similar to the one showed in ﬁgure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
24One important question that Proposition 7 does not answer is how likely is the occurrence of
collusion. In the proposed equilibrium, collusion occurs whenever the types belong to the sets
Av and Aw.F i g u r e1 suggest the shape of these sets, but it is hard to say how large is the area
that they represent. In fact, we are only able to prove that the sets Av and Aw are non-empty,
but not they their measure is diﬀerent from zero15.
It is clear however that, at least in some cases, the sets Av and Aw are signiﬁcant ones, so that
collusion is actually a relevant phenomenon even with large complementarities. One particularly
simple and striking case is the one in which the extent of the complementarity is known and
identical across bidders, i.e. the distribution of ki is degenerate on some value k∗ ≥ 1.I nt h i s
case, provided that the condition E (x) ≥ 1
2 holds, the strategies proposed in Proposition 1 are
still equilibrium strategies. In other words, the set Av and Aw described in Proposition 7 can
be taken to be Θv and Θw respectively, when the complementarities ki are known and identical
across bidders. The intuition is straightforward. If ki is the same for each bidder, then it will be
entirely competed away whenever the equilibrium of Proposition 6 is triggered. This makes any
attempt to get both objects unattractive, hence even types with very low ‘stand-alone’ values
can be induced to collude.
We conclude this section by reconsidering the conjecture according to which collusion de-
creases when complementarities are present. We have shown that the presence of complemen-
tarities does not destroy collusion. In fact, we have seen that large complementarities which are
known and common among the players do not reduce the possibility of collusion at all. What
really matters in hindering collusion is the variability of the extent of complementarities, rather
than their absolute values.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
When dynamic auctions are used to sell multiple objects, buyers can collude in order to reduce
their payments to the seller. A general feature of collusive equilibria in open ascending bid
auctions is that each bidder signals to the others which object has the highest value to her. After
the signaling rounds, the bidders implicitly promise each other not to compete on the objects
that they value less, provided they are not challenged on the objects they value more. We have
provided conditions under which this behavior can be made a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We
have also shown that some degree of collusion may still be present when the ratio of bidders to
objects is high, and when the bidders’ utility functions exhibit high complementarities.
15We thank the associate editor for pointing this out.
25As a more general point, the set of equilibria in auctions with multiple objects appears to be
much richer than in the single object case. In this paper, we have shown some of these equilibria.
It is worth pointing out that in all equilibria in which collusion-via-signalling occurs it must be
the case that not too much information is revealed by the equilibrium bidding strategy. To see
this, suppose, for example, that the bidding strategy were to reveal that one bidder has very
low values for both objects. Then the other bidder will decide to compete for both objects, i.e.
to revert to the SEA strategies, since her expected payments on both objects will be low. A
bidder with high values will accept a collusive outcome only if the information revealed is such
that her expected payment in open competition is suﬃciently high. But this must imply that
there is always some pooling among low and high values. This in turn implies that in general
collusion-via-signalling not only reduces the revenue to the seller, but also reduces the eﬃciency
of the ﬁnal allocation.
26Appendix
Propositions 1 and 2 are special cases, with z = 0, of Propositions 4 and 5 respectively. The
proof is given below, after the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Since each buyer is ex-ante symmetric, we can restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms,




2 | w ≤ v
ª
.
In the (a,w) space this corresponds to the set Θ+.
The following result in mechanism design theory, which we record here as Lemma 0, provides
a useful characterization of the (IC) constraints.
Lemma 0 The functions QV,Xand M satisfy (IC) if and only if:




∂a = QV (a,w) and
∂U(a,w)
∂w = X (a,w), almost everywhere.
Proof. See Armstrong [2], and Rochet and Chon´ e[ 4 0 ] .
The key simplifying step follows from the restriction that each buyer always gets exactly one
object.
Lemma 1 In any mechanism in which each buyer always gets exactly one object the interim
assignment function QV (a,w) must satisfy:
QV (a,w)=QV (a,0)
for almost all (a,w).
Proof. By Lemma 0, the diﬀerence between the surplus of type (a,w)w i t ha>0a n dt h e
surplus of type (0,0) can be written in two alternative ways:
• the integral along the “backward L” shape path: ﬁrst from (0,0) to (a,0), a n dt h e nf r o m
(a,0) to (a,w);
27• the integral along the path “inverse L” shape: ﬁrst from (0,0) to (0,w), a n dt h e nf r o m
(0,w)t o( a,w)16.
Integrating along the ﬁrst path yields
U (a,w) − U (0,0) =
Z a
0







QV (α,0) dα + w,
while using the second path we obtain











From these equalities we have
Z a
0




which in turn immediately implies the result, since the point (a,w) was arbitrary.




Q(α) dα + w + U (0,0), all (a,w),




















































[1 − ΨA (a)] Q(a) da.
16In the (v,w) space, the ﬁrst path goes horizontally from (0,0) to (a,0), a n dt h e nf r o m( a,0) to (v,w), along
a4 5 0 line. The second path goes from (0,0) to (w,w)a l o n gt h e4 5 0 line, and then horizontally from (w,w)t o
(v,w).
28(recall that ψA (a) ≡
R 1−a
0 ψ(a,w) dw and ΨA (a) ≡
R a
0 ψA (α) dα, and the weighting function is
normalized so that ΨA(1)=
R 1
0 ψA (α) dα = 1).




0 ψ (a,w) wdwda, which does not depend




[1 − ΨA(a)] Q(a) da
subject to
Q(a) is nondecreasing, (7)
and Z 1
a
Q(α) g (α) dα ≤
Z 1
a
G(α) g (α) dα, each a ∈ [0,1]. (8)
The constraint in (7) is implied by Lemma 0, i.e. by the convexity of any incentive compatible
surplus function. The constraints in (8) come from the fact that there is only one unit of object
v, hence the probability of selling the object to a buyer whose values’ diﬀerence is above any
given threshold a cannot exceed the probability that at least one buyer has diﬀerence above a.17
The following two steps will conclude the proof. First, we show that the assignment function
Q∗∗ (a) ≡ 3
4 induced by the ranking mechanism solves the above program for some positive
weighting function. Then we establish that the assignment function Q∗ (a) ≡ G(a) induced by
the equilibrium of Proposition 2 is optimal, if the ratio
1−Ψ(a)
g(a) is increasing.
Optimality of the ranking mechanism. For a =0 , the inequality in (8) is
Z 1
0




since, by symmetry, G(0) = 1
2 and
R 1






























29In particular, by the condition stated in Proposition 3, we can choose:
µ(a)=
R a
0 [1 − ΨA (t)]dt
2
R 1




g (t)dt, a ∈ [0,1], (9)
and the previous inequality becomes
Z 1
0





[1 − ΨA (a)] da. (10)
The function Q∗∗ (a)=3
4 is optimal because it maximizes the objective function among all
functions which satisfy the weaker condition (10).
Optimality of the equilibrium in Proposition 2. Multiplying each inequality in (8) by a














G(α) g (α) dα
¶
da,
or, exchanging the order of integration,
Z 1
0






0 φ(α) dα. Since
1−ΨA(a)
g(a) is increasing, we can choose the weighting function φ
to be both positive and such that Φ(a)=
1−ΨA(a)
g(a) ; hence the previous inequality becomes
Z 1
0
[1 − ΨA (a)] Q(a) da ≤
Z 1
0
[1 − ΨA(a)] G(a)da. (11)
It is now immediate to see that Q(a) ≡ G(a)s a t i s ﬁes the feasibility constraints in (8), and
maximizes the objective function among all functions which satisfy the weaker condition in (11).
Hence it is an optimal solution in the original program.
Proof of Proposition 4. Given the symmetry of the problem, it is enough to check the
optimality of the strategy for types having v ≥ w. We will do this proceeding backward.
Consider the ﬁrst round, t, at which only two bidders remain, say 1 and 2. Suppose that
bidder 1 has v1 ≥ w1 and has opened at round zero with {0,−∞}, while bidder 2 has opened
with {−∞,0}. Suppose also that the outstanding pair of bids at round t − 1 is (z,z). Let
FV (v2 |Tz)a n dFW (w2 |Tz) denote the c.d.f.. of v2 and w2 respectively, both conditional on the
set Tz :=
©
(v2,w 2) ∈ [0,1]
2 |z ≤ v2 ≤ w2
ª
.
30If bidder 1 changes her bids, then the SEA strategies are triggered, and her expected utility
is:
S (v1,w 1 |Tz)=
Z v1
z
(v1 − v2) dFV (v2 |Tz)+
Z w1
z
(w1 − w2) dFW (w2 |Tz).
To check that the deviation is unproﬁtable, we have to verify that
v1 − z ≥ S (v1,w 1 |Tz)
for each pair (v1,w 1)s u c ht h a tv1 ≥ w1.S i n c eS (v1,·|Tz) is increasing, it suﬃces to check the
inequality for the types on the diagonal, i.e. types such that v1 = w1.D e ﬁning:
γz (v1) ≡ S (v1,v 1 |Tz),v 1 ∈ [z,1],
the inequalities to be checked are:
v1 − z ≥ γz (v1), for each v1 ∈ [z,1].
We start by noting that this holds at v1 = z, since both sides are zero; and then observe that










is zero at v1 = z, and both positive and increasing for each v1 ∈ (z,1]. Thus the function γz (v1)
is increasing and convex, hence we are done if we can prove that
1 − z ≥ γz (1).
This can be rewritten as:
1 − z ≥ E [1 − v2 |Tz]+E [1 − w2 |Tz]=2 − E [v2 |Tz] − E [w2 |Tz],
or, using the symmetry of the joint distribution of v2 and w2,a s
E [v2 |Tz]+E [v2 |Lz] ≥ 1 + z, (12)
where Lz :=
©
(v2,w 2) ∈ [0,1]
2 |z ≤ w2 ≤ v2
ª
. By symmetry, we have
1
2
=P r( Tz |z ≤ v2,z≤ w2)=P r ( Lz |z ≤ v2,z≤ w2),
hence
E [v2 |Tz]+E [v2 |Lz]=2 E [v2 |z ≤ v2,z≤ w2];
31and, since v2 and w2 are independent, we have E [v2 |z ≤ v2,z≤ w2]=E [v2 |z ≤ v2], so that
the inequality in (12) can be written as:




This is the condition stated in the Proposition, and we can therefore conclude that the bidders
will collude when the opportunity arises.
The optimality of the strategies when more than two bidders are left follows from the fact
that any other strategy simply destroys the opportunity of collusion should it arise, and does
not improve the outcome otherwise.
The only thing which is left to show is that in the ﬁrst round each bidder is willing to signal
truthfully the triangle in which her type is. This is going to matter for bidder i only if she is
still bidding after n − 2 other bidders have dropped out and the only other bidder who is still
bidding is competing for both objects. We show that for any given z at which this may happen
it is better to have announced the correct triangle at date 0.
If bidder 1 announces the correct triangle, then the expected payoﬀ conditional on being one






S (v1,w 1 |Tz)( 13)
This is because, given the symmetry in the distributions of v and w for each i, with probability
1
2 the opponent is of type w2 ≥ v2, so that her initial bid is {−∞,0}, and with probability 1
2 the
opponent is of type v2 ≥ w2.I n t h e ﬁrst case the auction ends immediately, yielding a payoﬀ
v1 − z, while in the second case bidders go on playing the SEA equilibrium.
If the bidder opens with {−∞,0} then the expected payoﬀ conditional on being one of the






S (v1,w 1 |Lz)( 14)
(notice that now S is conditional to v2 ≥ w2 rather than to v2 ≤ w2). The expression in (14)
does not exceed the one in (13) if
v1 + S (v1,w 1 |Tz) ≥ w1 + S (v1,w 1 |Lz),
which holds with equality if v1 = w1. Moreover, the derivatives with respect to v1 are
1 + FV (v1 |Tz)
for the LHS, and
FV (v1 |Lz)
32for the RHS. Hence the LHS grows faster than the RHS as v1 is increased, thus implying that
the inequality holds for each v1 >w 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . Again, because of symmetry it suﬃces to check the optimality of
the strategy along the equilibrium path for a bidder whose type is in the ‘lower triangle.’ We
proceed backward.
Suppose ﬁrst that only two players are left, say 1 and 2. If 1 opened with {0,−∞} and 2
opened with {−∞,0}, then the analysis of Proposition 4 applies, since condition (4) implies
E (x|z ≤ x ≤ 1) ≥ (1 + z)/2f o ra = 0, hence deviating to the SEA strategy is not proﬁtable.
If instead both bidders have opened with {0,−∞}, then we have to show that bidder 1 with
type v1 − w1 = a1 is willing to raise the bid on the ﬁrst object only if she is not assigned object
v and the outstanding bids are (p,z)w i t hp<a 1 + z. There are two possible deviations from
the equilibrium path:
1) Stop bidding on v, and raise the bid on w by a small amount if necessary, i.e. if 1 is not
currently assigned w. This deviation yields at most w1 − z. Deﬁne
Lz (p − z)=
©
(v2,w 2) ∈ [z,1]
2 |p − z ≤ v2 − w2,z≤ w2
ª
.
The set Lz (p) is the support of bidder 1’s beliefs about 2’s values conditional on the last round’s
bids being (p,z) for each bidder. The expected utility from following the equilibrium strategy is:
U
∗ (v1,w 1|Lz (p − z)) = Pr{a2 ≤ a1 |Lz (p − z)} (v1 − E [a2 |a2 ≤ a1,L z (p − z)])
+Pr{a2 ≥ a1 |Lz (p − z)} (w1 − z),
which can be written as:
U
∗ (v1,w 1|Lz (p − z)) = w1 − z +P r{a2 ≤ a1 |Lz (p − z)}(a1 − E [a2 |a2 ≤ a1,L z (p − z)] + z).
It is clear that the last expression is higher than w1 − z.
2) Raise the bid on w, without stopping the bidding on v. In this case, the SEA equilibrium is
triggered and we have to verify that:
U
∗ (v1,w 1|Lz (p − z)) ≥ S (v1,w 1|Lz (p − z))
It is enough to check the inequality at p = a1 + z. Triggering the SEA equilibrium before p
reaches that level can only do worse.
Using v1 = w1 + a1, the relevant inequality to be checked is therefore:
w1 − z ≥
Z w1+a1
a1+z
(w1 + a1 − v2)dFV (v2|Lz (a1 + z)) +
Z w1
z
(w1 − w2)dFW (w2|Lz (a1 + z))
33The inequality is satisﬁed at w1 = z and the RHS is increasing and convex. Applying the same
reasoning as in Proposition 4 we conclude that it is enough to check the inequality:
1 − a1 − z ≥
Z 1
a1+z
(1 − v2)dFV (v2|Lz (a1 + z)) +
Z 1−a1
z
(1 − a1 − w2)dFW (w2|Lz (a1 + z))
where use is made of the fact that the highest possible value for w1 when v1 −w1 ≥ a1 is 1−a1.
The inequality is equivalent to:
E [v2|v2 ≥ a1 + w2,1 − a1 ≥ w2 ≥ z]+E [w2|v2 − a1 ≥ w2 ≥ z,v2 ≥ a1 + z] ≥ 1 + z
or:
E [x | x ≥ a + y, y ≥ z]+E [y | x − y ≥ a ≥ z, x ≥ a + z] ≥ 1 + z
which is inequality 5 stated in the Proposition.
Finally, we check that a bidder wants to stop after the other bidder has stopped the bidding,
rather than competing for both objects. Suppose that the bidder has v1 − w1 = a and the other
bidder stopped at z + a0 with a0 ≤ a.I nt h i sc a s ed e ﬁne:
Ωa0,z =
©
(v2,w 2) ∈ [z,1]
2 |v2 − w2 = a
0ª
.
Then the inequality becomes:
v1 − a














Using w1 = v1 − a we can rewrite the inequality as:
v1 − a














Again, the inequality is satisﬁed at v1 = z + a, the RHS is increasing and convex and we have
only to check:
1 − a














In order to compute the integrals observe:
Pr(v2 ≤ x|v2 = w2 + a
0,v 2 ≥ z,w2 ≥ z)=P r( w2 ≤ x − a
0 |1 − a
0 ≥ w2 ≥ z)
=
Pr(x − a0 ≥ w2 ≥ z)




F(1−a0)−F(z) if x ≥ z + a0
0o t h e r w i s e
34Therefore:
f (v2 |v2 = w2 + a
0,v 2 ≥ z,w2 ≥ z)=
(
f(v2−a0)
F(1−a0)−F(z) if v2 ≥ z + a0
0o t h e r w i s e
Similar computations lead to:
f (w2 |v2 = w2 + a
0,v 2 ≥ z,w2 ≥ z)=
(
f(w2+a0)
1−F(z+a0) if 1 − a0 ≥ w2 ≥ z










a0+z v2f (v2 − a0)dv2
F (1 − a0) − F (z)
and R 1
a0+z v2f (v2 − a0)dv2
F (1 − a0) − F (z)
=
R 1−a0
z (y + a0)f (y)dy
F (1 − a0) − F (z)












z (1 − a − w2)f (w2 + a0)dw2
1 − F (z + a0)
=( 1 − a)
F (1 − (a − a0)) − F (a0 + z)
1 − F (a0 + z)
−
R 1−a
z w2f (w2 + a0)dw2
1 − F (z + a0)
and R 1−a
z w2f (w2 + a0)dw2
1 − F (z + a0)
=
R 1−(a−a0)
z+a0 (y − a0)f (y)dy
1 − F (z + a0)
R 1−(a−a0)
z+a0 (y − a0)f (y)dy




1 − F (z + a)
− a
Combining these results we obtain the following condition:
1 − a




F (1 − (a − a0)) − F (a0 + z)
1 − F (a0 + z)
−
R 1−a
z w2f (w2 + a0)dw2
1 − F (z + a0)
The inequality has to hold for each a ≥ a0. Noticing that the RHS is decreasing in a,t h er e l e v a n t
condition is obtained setting a = a0. This yields:
E [x | x − y ≥ a, y ≥ z]+E [y | x − y ≥ a ≥ z, x ≥ a + z] ≥ 1 + z
which is inequality 4 stated in the Proposition.
35T h ea r g u m e n tf o ro p t i m a l i t yw h e nm o r et h a nt h r e eb i d d e r sa r ea c t i v ei si d e n t i c a lt ot h eo n e
of Proposition 4: there is no point in triggering the SEA strategies at the opening, since the
decision can always be taken later.
The only thing that remain to be proved is that it is convenient to open in the ‘true’ triangle.
Possible deviations in this case are opening in the ‘wrong’ triangle or opening bidding on both
objects, thus triggering the SEA equilibrium. The initial bid is only relevant if the bidder ends
up among the two last bidders. We will show that for every z, and conditional on being one
of the two last bidders, opening in the ‘true’ triangle gives a higher expected utility than any
deviation.
The expected utility conditional on being one of the two remaining bidders at z for a type








(w1 +P r( a2 ≤ a1)(a1 − E (a2 |a2 ≤ a1))) − z (15)
where a2 = v2 − w2 and the probability distribution is conditional to v2 ≥ z,w2 ≥ z.T h i s i s
because with probability 1
2 the other bidder has opened in the upper triangle, so that the auction
ends and 1 obtains v1 at price z, while with probability 1
2 the other bidder opens in the lower
triangle. In the latter case the bidder pays at least z and obtains at least w1 It additionally
obtains a1 minus the price when the auction is won. Triggering the SEA equilibrium with an
opening other than {−∞,0} or {0,−∞} is obviously dominated, since the SEA equilibrium can
be triggered later at no cost. We have therefore only to check that it is not convenient to open
in the wrong triangle.
Suppose 1 opens bidding {−∞,0}, i.e. signaling the ‘wrong’ triangle. If the other bidder also
opens with {−∞,0} then the best strategy is to pretend to have a1 =0 a n dg e tv for z.T h i s
is clearly better than getting w for a price greater than z. The other possibility is to trigger the
SEA strategies: To show that this cannot be optimal we have to check the inequality:
v1 − z ≥ S (v1,w 1|Lz)
Under the assumptions stated in the Proposition the inequality is satisﬁed (the analysis is the
same as before).
If the other bidder opens with {0,−∞} then any attempt to compete on good v triggers the
SEA equilibrium. The payoﬀ in this case is therefore whatever is best between obtaining w1 at z
and triggering the SEA equilibrium, that is max{w1 − z,S(v1,w 1|Lz)}. We therefore conclude
that the expected payoﬀ, conditional on being one of the two players left at z, when the opening








max{w1 − z,S(v1,w 1|Lz)} (16)
36If w1 − z ≥ S (v1,w 1|Lz) then this is clearly less that the utility obtained in equilibrium. If
w1 − z<S(v1,w 1|Lz) the condition that the deviation be not proﬁtable, that is (15) is greater
than (16), can be written as:
w1 +P r( a2 ≤ a1)(a1 − E (a2 |a2 ≤ a1)) − z ≥ S (v1,w 1|Lz)
which is satisﬁed under the conditions stated in the Proposition because it is equivalent to the
condition that it is optimal to follow the equilibrium strategy after opening in the ‘true’ triangle.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . Recall that θi := vi + wi + ki,i= 1,2, and let the bids of each
bidder be represented as a pair, with the ﬁrst element referring to object v and the second to
object w. Also, let bv and bw denote the highest bids on v and w respectively, and bi
v and bi
w the
highest bids by bidder i on v and w respectively. The following is a symmetric perfect Bayesian
equilibrium yielding the desired outcome:
• Open with the minimum bid on each object. In the following rounds, if you are bidder i,
behave as follows:
• If all bidders but you have been silent on v, and at least two bidders have increased the
bid on w in the previous round, then stay silent on v, and increase the bid on w by the
minimum amount if bw <w i + ki; otherwise stay silent;
• If all bidders but you have been silent on w, and at least two bidders have increased the
bid on v in the previous round, then stay silent on w, and increase the bid on v by the
minimum amount if bv <v i + ki;otherwise stay silent;
• In all other cases raise the bid on both v and w by the minimum amount if bv + bw <
vi +wi +ki and there is a positive probability that vi +wi +ki >v j +wj +kj for all j 6= i.
Stay silent otherwise.
Beliefs are as follows.




w)=( bv,b w) (that is, bidder j is among the winners of both objects) then it is the
conditional probability on (vj,w j,k j)s u b j e c tt ovj + wj + kj ≥ 2bv.
• If (bj
v,b j




v >kthen it is the conditional probability on (vj,w j,k j)s u b j e c tt o
vj + wj + kj < 2bj
v.




Case 2. The outstanding bid is bv 6= bw. This can only occur if all players have taken an out
of equilibrium action. When this happens, we specify that beliefs about any bidder who made
an oﬀer (bv,b w)w i t hbv 6= bw have support on [0,min{bj
v,1}] × [0,min{bj
w,1}] ×{ k}, while the
probability distribution on bidders such that bj
v = bj
w is the conditional probability on (vj,w j,k j)
subject to vj + wj + kj < 2bj
v.
The outcome of this strategy proﬁle is that each bidder i increases the bids by the minimum
amount on both objects up to the point at which the sum of the bids reaches θi,a n ds t o p s
bidding afterwards. Therefore, the bidder with the highest θi wins the objects paying a price
equal to maxj6=i θj.
We now check that there are no proﬁtable deviations. Suppose ﬁr s tt h a ti nt h ep r e v i o u s
round all bidders but i have been silent on v but some has increased the bid on w. This can
only happen out of equilibrium. Any bidders j who stayed on the equilibrium path must have
θj <b v + bw, so the equilibrium strategy prescribes that she will not bid further. Any bidder j0
who was out of the equilibrium is not expected to increase the bid any further, since (given the
speciﬁed beliefs) with probability 1 their type θj0 is not the highest. Therefore, bidder i expects
no further bids on v.O n c e v is taken for granted, it is rational to bid on w up to wi + ki.A
symmetric reasoning applies when i is the sole active bidder on w and not on v. Finally, it is
obvious that staying silent is i’s optimal strategy if all her opponents have been silent on both
objects.
Consider now the other cases. By following the equilibrium strategy, bidder i obtains utility
max{θi − maxj6=i θj, 0}. A deviation can lead to getting both objects, getting a single object
and getting no object. In the ﬁrst case, given the equilibrium strategy of the other bidders, the
price paid for the two objects must be at least maxj6=iθj, hence the deviation is not proﬁtable.
I nt h es e c o n dc a s e ,t h ep r i c ep a i df o rt h es i n g l eo b j e c ti sa tl e a s tk, thus again the deviation is
not proﬁtable. Finally, a deviation is obviously not proﬁtable if it leads to losing both objects.
Proof of Proposition 7. Using the arguments of Proposition 6 we have that the strategies
described in the last point of the Proposition constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium at any
given stage. We are left with the task of ﬁnding the appropriate sets Av, Aw, show that the
38prescribed strategy is optimal for all types at stage 0, and that for types in Av, Aw it is optimal
















Deﬁne s ≡ v + w + k,a n dl e tH (s)b et h ec . d . f .o ns, that is:
H (x)=P r{v + w + k ≤ x}





Furthermore, given the symmetry of (v,w) and the independence of the distributions of v,w,k
we have that H (s|Θv)=H (s|Θw). Deﬁne the sets A0
v = Θv, A0





(v,w,k) ∈ Θv|v ≥
Z v+w+k
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(v,w,k) ∈ Θw|w ≥
Z v+w+k
k
(v + w + k − s) dH (s|Θv)
¾
Thus, A1
v is the set of types in Θv who prefer to have v for free rather than competing for the
bundle when it is known that the type of the other bidder lies in Θw. A symmetric interpretation
holds for A1
w. Observe that the sets A1
v and A1
w are compact and connected.
It is clear that the two sets are symmetric, meaning that if (a,b,c) ∈ A1
v then (b,c,a) ∈ A1
w
Furthermore, it is also clear that H (s|A1
w)=H (s|A1
v). Now, given two symmetric sets An
v and
An
w with the property that H (s|An
w)=H (s|An
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(v,w,k) ∈ Θw|w ≥
Z v+w+k
k






w are compact and connected then An+1
v and An+1
w are also compact and connected.
We claim that the sequence {An
v} has a converging subsequence, and that the set Av to which
the subsequence converges is the set we are looking for.
Let H(Θv) be the set of non-empty compact subsets of Θv.F o r a g i v e n s e t X ∈ H(Θv)
deﬁne the set:
Bε (X)={y ∈ Θv ||y − x| < ε for some x ∈ X}
39The space H(Θv) is a metric space when endowed with the Hausdorﬀ distance:
ρ(X,Y)=m i n{ε > 0|X ⊂ Bε (Y )a n dY ⊂ Bε (X)}
Since the set Θv is compact, the set H(Θv) is also compact (see e.g. Mas Colell (1985), Proposi-
tion A.5.1). The sequence {An
v} i sas e q u e n c eo fe l e m e n t si nH(Θv), and since the set is compact
there exists a converging subsequence. Let Av be the non-empty, compact subset of Θv to which
the subsequence converge, and observe that since all elements in {An
v} are connected then Av is
connected too (Mas Colell (1985), Proposition A.5.1). The set Aw can be obtained using exactly
the same procedure.
The sets Av and Aw satisfy the equilibrium conditions. Observe ﬁr s tt h a tf o re a c hs and n
we have H (s|An
v) − H (s|An




v) − H (s|A
n
w)=H (s|Av) − H (s|Aw)=0 ( 17)
Consider now that a type (v,w,k) ∈ Av. The equilibrium strategy prescribes:
1.O p e nw i t h{0,−∞}.
2. If the other bidder opens with {−∞,0} then stop bidding. In all other cases, use the SEA
strategy.
Let us ﬁrst check that the strategy after opening with {0,−∞} and observing {−∞,0} is




(v1 + w1 + k − s)dH (s|Aw)
Using (17) and the fact that (v1,w 1,k) ∈ Av we obtain:
v ≥ S (v1,w 1,k|Aw)
We now check optimality at stage 0. It clearly makes no sense to trigger the SEA strategy.
The only other possible deviation is to bid {−∞,0}, thus signalling that the type belongs to
Aw.I ti sn o tp r o ﬁtable to use the SEA equilibrium after the other type signals Av, since this is
equivalent to triggering directly the SEA equilibrium with probability 1, which we know not to
be proﬁtable. Suppose now that collusion is accepted. Then we compare the expected utility of
the deviation:
Pr(Av)w1 +( 1 − Pr(Av))S (v1,w 1,k 1|qAv)
40with the expected utility of the equilibrium strategy:
Pr(Aw)v1 +( 1 − Pr(Aw))S (v1,w 1,k 1|qAw)
B u tn o wo b s e r v et h a tt h es y m m e t r yo fAv and Aw implies Pr(Av)=P r( Aw) and:
S (v1,w 1,k 1|qAv)=S (v1,w 1,k 1|qAw)
Since v1 ≥ w1 we conclude that the deviation is not proﬁtable.
A symmetric reasoning shows that types (v1,w 1,k 1) / ∈ Av ∪ Aw are not better oﬀ opening
with {0,−∞} or {−∞,0}. In this case the bidder is going to trigger the SEA strategy no matter
what the opening bid of the other bidder is, so that announcing {0,0} and triggering the SEA
equilibrium from the very beginning is optimal.
41References
[1]A N T O N ,J .a n dY A OD .( 1992) ‘Coordination in Split Award Auctions’, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 681-707.
[ 2 ]A R M S T R O N G ,M .( 1996) ‘Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing’, Econometrica, 64: 51—75.
[3] ARMSTRONG, M. (2000) ‘Optimal Multi-Object Auctions ’, Review of Economic Studies
67: 455—481.
[4] AUSUBEL, L. and CRAMTON, P. (1998) ‘Demand Reduction and Ineﬃciency in Multi-
Unit Auctions’, Working paper, University of Maryland.
[5] AUSUBEL, L. and CRAMTON, P. (1999) ‘The Optimality of Being Eﬃcient’, Working
paper, University of Maryland.
[6] AUSUBEL, L. and SCHWARTZ, J. (1999) ‘The Ascending Auction Paradox’, mimeo, Uni-
versity of Maryland.
[ 7 ] A V E R Y ,C .( 1998) ‘Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions’, Review of Economic Stud-
ies 65: 483—497.
[8] AVERY, C. and HENDERSHOTT, T. (2000) ‘Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple
Products’, Review of Economic Studies 67: 483—497.
[9] BENOIT, J. and KRISHNA, V. (2001) ‘Multiple Object Auctions with Budget Constrained
Bidders,’ Review of Economic Studies, , 68: 155-179.
[10] BERNHAIM, D. K. and WHINSTON, M. (1990) ‘Multimarket Contact and Collusive Be-
havior’ Rand Journal of Economics, 21: 1—26.
[11]B O R D E R ,K .( 1991) ‘Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: a Geometric Approach’
Econometrica, 59: 1175—1187.
[12] CAILLAUD, B. and JEHIEL, P.(1998) ‘Collusion in Auctions with Externalities’, Rand
Journal of Economics, 29: 680-702.
[13] CAMPBELL, C. (1998) ‘Coordination in Auction with Entry’, mimeo, Ohio State Univer-
sity.
[14] CHAKRABORTY, I. (1998) ‘Equilibrium in Sealed-Bid Auctions for Multiple Units with
Increasing Returns’, mimeo.
42[15] CRAMTON, P. (2000) ‘Lessons from the United States Spectrum Auctions,’ Prepared Tes-
timony before the United States Senate Budget Committee, February.
[16] CRAMTON, P. and SCHWARTZ, J. (2000) ‘Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC
Spectrum Auctions’, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17: 229-252
[17] DANIEL, K. and HIRSHLEIFER, D. (1998) ‘A Theory of Costly Sequential Bidding’,
mimeo, Northwestern University.
[18] DASGUPTA, P. and MASKIN, E. (2000) ‘Eﬃcient Auctions’, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 115:3 4 1-388.
[19] The Economist (1997) ‘Learning to Play the Game’, May 17, page 94.
[20] ENGELBRECHT-WIGGANS, R. and KAHN, C. (1998) ‘Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform
Prices’, Economic Theory; 12: 227-258.
[21] ENGELBRECHT-WIGGANS, R. and KAHN, C. (1999) ‘Low Revenue Equilibria in As-
cending Price, Multi-Object Auctions’, mimeo, University of Illinois.
[22] ESO, P. and MASKIN, E. (1999) ‘Multi-Good Eﬃcient Auctions with Multi-Dimensional
Information’, mimeo, Harvard University.
[23] GRAHAM, D. and MARSHALL, R. (1987) ‘Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object
Second-Price and English Auctions’, Journal of Political Economy; 95: 1217-39.
[24] GUL, F. and STACCHETTI, E. (2000) ‘English and Double Auctions with Diﬀerentiated
Commodities’, Journal of Economiv Theory; 92: 66-95.
[25] HOPENHAYN, H. and SKRZYPACZ, A. (1999) “Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions,”
working paper No. 463, University of Rochester, July.
[26] KRISHNA, V. and MAENNER, E. (2001) “Convex Potential with an Application to Mech-
anism Design,” Econometrica, forthcoming.
[27] KWASNICA, A. (1998) ‘Collusion in Multiple Object Simultaneous Auctions: Theory and
Experiments’, working paper, Caltech SSWP1010.
[28] KWASNICA, A. and SHERSTYUK, K. (2000) ‘Collusion via Signaling in Multi-Unit Auc-
tions with Synergies: An Experimental Test’, mimeo, Pennsylvania State University.
43[29] JEHIEL, P. and MOLDAVANU, B. (1999) ‘A Note on Revenue Maximization and Eﬃciency
in Multi-Object Auctions’ mimeo, University College, London and University of Mannheim.
[ 3 0 ]L O P O M O ,G .( 1998) ‘The English Auction is Optimal among Simple Sequential Auctions’,
Journal of Economic Theory 82: 144-66.
[31]M A I L A T H ,G .a n dZ E M S K Y ,P .( 1991) ‘Collusion in Second Price Auctions with Hetero-
geneous Bidders’ Games and Economic Behavior 3: 467-86.
[32] MAS COLELL, A. (1985) The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium: A Diﬀerentiable
Approach, Econometric Society Monographs no 9, Cambridge University Press.
[33] MENICUCCI, D. (2000) ‘Optimal Two-Object Auctions with Synergies’, doctoral disserta-
tion, Chapter 2, Universidad Pompeu Fabra.
[34] MILGROM, P. (2000) ‘Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending
Auction’, Journal of Political Economy, 108: 245-272.
[35] MCAFEE, P. and MCMILLAN, J. (1992) ‘Bidding Rings’ American Economic Review, 93:
579-99.
[36] MCAFEE, P. and MCMILLAN, J. (1996) ‘Analyzing the Airwaves Auction’ Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 10: 159-175.
[37] MYERSON, R. (1981): ‘Optimal Auction Design’, Mathematics of Operations Research,
6: 58—73.
[38] PERRY, M., and RENY, P. (1999) ‘An Ex-Post Eﬃcient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction’,
mimeo.
[39] PESENDORFER, M., (2000) ‘A Study of Collusion in First Price Auctions’, Review of
Economic Studies, 67:3 8 1—411.
[ 4 0 ]R O C H E T ,J . ,a n dC H I N E ,P .( 1998) ‘Ironing, Sweeping and Multidimensional Screening’,
Econometrica, 66: 783-826.
[41] SHERSTYUK, K. (2000) ‘A Note on Honest Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction with Additive
Common Complementarities’, mimeo, University of Haway.
[42] VISWANATHANAN, S. and WANG, J. and WITELSKI, T. (2000) “Optimal Bidding in
Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions: Two Bidders” mimeo.
44Av
2+ k
s1
0v 1 1
k
Figure 1:
45